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Abstract: Over the past decade, social media platforms have penetrated deeply into the mech-
anics of everyday life, affecting people's informal interactions, as well as institutional structures 
and professional routines. Far from being neutral platforms for everyone, social media have 
changed the conditions and rules of social interaction. In this article, we examine the intricate  
dynamic between social media platforms, mass media, users, and social institutions by calling 
attention to social media logic—the norms, strategies, mechanisms, and economies—underpin-
ning its dynamics. This logic will be considered in light of what has been identified as mass me-
dia  logic,  which  has  helped  spread  the  media's  powerful  discourse  outside  its  institutional 
boundaries. Theorizing social media logic, we identify four grounding principles—programmabil-
ity, popularity, connectivity, and datafication—and argue that these principles become increas-
ingly entangled with mass media logic. The logic of social media, rooted in these grounding 
principles and strategies, is gradually invading all areas of public life. Besides print news and 
broadcasting, it also affects law and order, social activism, politics, and so forth. Therefore, its 
sustaining logic and widespread dissemination deserve to be scrutinized in detail in order to 
better understand its impact in various domains. Concentrating on the tactics and strategies at 
work in social media logic, we reassess the constellation of power relationships in which social  
practices unfold, raising questions such as: How does social media logic modify or enhance ex-
isting mass media logic? And how is this new media logic exported beyond the boundaries of  
(social or mass) media proper? The underlying principles, tactics, and strategies may be relat-
ively simple to identify, but it is much harder to map the complex connections between plat -
forms that distribute this logic: users that employ them, technologies that drive them, economic 
structures that scaffold them, and institutional bodies that incorporate them.
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1. Introduction
"Dutch teen's sweet sixteen party invitation goes viral 
on Facebook, ends in 3,000 rioting in Groningen sub-
urb" was only one of many headlines summarizing the 
series of events that led to an outburst of violence in 
Haren (Netherlands) on Friday 21 September 2012 [1]. 
A girl posting an invitation to her sweet sixteen party 
accidentally put her Facebook-setting to "public", gen-
erating enormous buzz on social  media platforms in 
the week preceding the party. When she realized her 
mistake, the teenager canceled the party, but this did 
not  prevent  thousands  of  people  from  organizing 
themselves online to join the celebration. Newspapers 
and television started to pick up the story a few days 
before the annulled gathering. The story got bigger as 
more people tapped into the viral stream. On the even-
ing of 21 September 2012, broadcast media started to 
report live from Haren, where police had barricaded the 
streets  while  visitors  from all  over the country were 
pouring in. Some youngsters were wearing "Project X 
Haren" T-shirts, after the recent American film about a 
party that grows out of control. The police could not 
prevent serious rioting and by the next morning, the 
peaceful suburb of Haren counted 34 injured and mil-
lions in damages.
After what became known as "the Facebook riots", 
people quickly started to point fingers at one or more 
visible culprits:  Facebook, which sparked the riots or 
did nothing to prevent them from happening;  mass 
media, which fanned the fire with their on site report-
ing,  which some argued substantially aggravated the 
crowds' impact; the  police who were ill prepared and 
did not redress social media signals seriously; and finally, 
the  rioters who  deployed  social  media  to  "inflame" 
innocent youth and encourage many to participate in 
an outburst of violence. In the Dutch press, some de-
fended the neutrality  of social  media as channels of 
communication, while others disputed this. Most com-
mentators  agreed that although Facebook and social 
media in general could not be held responsible for the 
"spontaneous" revolt, users and institutions should be-
come more aware of the impact of these new tools [2]. 
The Haren city council issued an investigation, resulting 
in a thorough analysis of the role (social) media played 
in these events [3]. The report concluded that neither 
mass media nor social media could be pinpointed as 
causing these riots, but their merging  dynamics were 
instrumental in shaping the course of events.
Over the past decade, social media platforms have 
penetrated deeply into the mechanics of everyday life, 
affecting people's informal interactions, as well as in-
stitutional  structures  and  professional  routines.  We 
could look at them as the latest innovation in com-
puter-mediated  communication  that  poses  serious 
challenges to existing institutions, such as mass media 
and government authorities. Indeed, the fast growth 
of online platforms forces everyone to adapt to a new 
reality,  where  the  mass  distribution  of  information, 
news, and entertainment seems no longer the priv-
ilege  of  the  institutional  few.  Fast-growing networks 
like Facebook and Twitter with millions of active users 
are rapidly penetrating public communication, affecting 
the  operational  and  institutional  power  balance  of 
media systems. But "social media" or "mass media" are 
hardly autonomous forces in the organization of social 
events.  Phenomena  like  the  Haren  riots  materialize 
through an intricate web of online and offline settings 
connected by a dynamic constellation of technological, 
economical, and socio-cultural mechanisms.
In order to understand how this new media ecosys-
tem reshapes social orders or chains of events, we want 
to call attention to  social media logic—the strategies, 
mechanisms, and economies underpinning these plat-
forms' dynamics. This logic will be considered in light of 
what  has previously  been identified as  mass media 
logic, which helped spread the media's powerful dis-
course  outside  its  proper  institutional  boundaries. 
After reintroducing mass media logic, we will turn to 
social  media  logic  and  identify  four  grounding  ele-
ments to describe how this logic functions: program-
mability,  popularity,  connectivity,  and  datafication. 
Social  media logic,  as we will  argue, is  increasingly 
becoming entangled with mass media logic; and even 
though these logics are mutually reinforcing, they are 
also succinctly different. The logic of social media, as 
was  previously  the  case  with  mass  media  logic,  is 
gradually dissipating into all  areas of public life; the 
cultural and commercial dynamics determining social 
media blend with existing commercial and advertising 
practices, while also changing them. Far from being 
neutral platforms, social media are affecting the con-
ditions and rules of social interaction. Therefore, their 
sustaining logic deserves to be scrutinized in detail to 
better understand its impact in various domains.
2. Mass Media Logic
During  most  of  the  twentieth  century,  mass  media 
gained power not only by cementing their institutional 
status,  but  also  by  developing  a  commanding  dis-
course that guided the organization of public space. 
The formal grid of understanding that steers informa-
tion, news, and communication was effectively expor-
ted to vital areas beyond media organizations, where 
mass media gained legitimacy mostly through the in-
fluence of  its  logic.  Over thirty  years  ago, David Al-
theide and Robert Snow (1979) defined (mass) media 
logic as a set of principles or common sense rationality 
cultivated in and by media institutions that penetrates 
every  public  domain  and  dominates  its  organizing 
structures: "In contemporary society, every institution 
has become part of media culture: changes have oc-
curred in every major institution that are a result of 
media logic in presenting and interpreting activity in 
those institutions" ([4],  p.  11).  The power  of  mass 
media,  they argued,  was mostly  diffused and exer-
cised through discursive  strategies and performative 
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tactics that became accepted as "natural" or "neutral" 
in all kinds of institutional contexts.
So what strategies and tactics make up mass media 
logic in its original formulation? When defining media 
logic in the late 1970s, Altheide and Snow singled out 
a number of elements, partly relating to its ability to 
frame reality and partly pertaining to media's claim to-
wards neutrality or independence. For instance, media 
logic  presents  the  world  as  a  continuous  flow  of 
events, an incessant stream of things and people "out 
there". The nature of media logic is "to saturate cov-
erage of events over a short period of time, slack off, 
and eventually turn to something else" ([4], p. 238). 
Topics  wax and  wane  in  the  public's  attention,  but 
there  is  nothing  natural  about  this  stream;  media 
have a distinct interest in constantly renewing themes 
so people keep coming back to their outlets. This ap-
plied to print but even more so to television. Accord-
ing to Raymond Williams, broadcast media create a 
programmed  flow,  which  captures  the  attention  of 
audiences and glues them to the screen [5]. The ra-
tionality of quick turnover rates dominates the selec-
tion of news itself, like a commodity principle. Moreover, 
television's ability for liveness shows the tendency to 
stage its flow of programmed events as unmediated 
real-life  registration  [6-8].  Television  cameras  and 
broadcast techniques add immediacy and intensity to 
the rhetorical power of words: shots of bloody victims 
or  sweating  presidential  candidates  have  emotional 
impact, enhancing television's potential to sway large 
audiences towards collective pathos.
Secondly, the tendency of mass media is to present 
themselves as neutral platforms that fairly represent 
different public voices and opinions, whereas in fact 
they operate as filters through which some people get 
more  exposure  than  others.  Implied  in  the  original 
theory of media logic was the appearance of institu-
tional  independence—independence  from  state  or 
commerce—and to present its products as balanced 
representations of the public interest by means of dis-
cursive and procedural strategies. Discursively speak-
ing, news items were separated from advertisements, 
and opinion distinguished from facts. As Altheide and 
Snow observed, the seeming neutrality of media logic 
was  activated  through  staging  experts  speaking  on 
behalf of institutions (e.g. the police or science), or by 
singling out representatives of the people's voice. Some 
people become media personalities not as a result of 
their specific knowledge, but by virtue of their ability to 
fit in with specific media formats: "[T]heir opinion and 
advice  is  not  sought  for  the  knowledge  they  might 
have, but because of their fame as people who operate 
within the familiar form of media logic" ([4], p. 241).
Another part of media logic derives its impact from 
the  way  it  has  anchored its  seeming  independence 
and  neutrality  in  standardized  procedures,  for  in-
stance, neutral presentation by anchors, coverage of 
events by reporters, and subjective commentaries by 
authoritative voices—formats that are widely adopted 
and imitated outside media proper. One of the most 
insidious aspects of media self-legitimation,  Altheide 
and Snow ([4],  p.  245) contended, was the use of 
ratings, polls, and other surveys as scientific evidence 
of audience demand and also as a legitimizing tool for 
amplifying "representative" public voices. 
The  articulation  of  media  logic  in  the  late  1970s 
posed  an  alternative  view to  the  many  institutional, 
techno-political, and economic theories of media—ana-
lyses that often regarded mass media as institutional 
occupants of the public sphere. Unfortunately, the the-
ory of media logic was never updated to include the 
many significant changes media underwent in the last 
two decades of the twentieth century. One such im-
portant shift was the proliferation, in the early 1980s, 
of cable television and the emergence of special niche 
audiences rather than mass publics; another important 
change was the general commercialization of culture, 
where news and information were increasingly infused 
by advertising practices in which facts and opinion were 
progressively  mixed  [9-11].  Media  logic  adapted  to 
these new market realities by deploying many of these 
proven  strategies  and  tactics  to  reaffirm  boundaries 
that  had long started to erode: boundaries  between 
news and advertisements, facts and opinion, public ser-
vice and commerce.
As a result, so-called public values were transported 
outside its institutional sphere to enhance corporate or 
state legitimacy [12]. For example, the news routine of 
quoting certified experts  was imitated in advertising, 
where  professors  in  lab  coats  cited  "evidence"  of 
research outcomes to promote branded products. The 
division between content and commerce became even 
fuzzier as content producers—particularly producers of 
news—were  pressured  to  obey  to  the  laws  of  the 
market or give in to public demand [13]. Government 
officials began to hire public relations officers to mas-
sage  their  relationship  with  citizens;  and  politicians 
employed spin-doctors to influence public opinion and 
voters [14-16]. Commercial stations such as Fox News 
demonstrate  how media  outlets  copy  the  superficial 
trappings of media neutrality while explicitly articulating 
an ideological stance. Over the past decades, broadcast 
producers  perfected  audiovisual  grammar  to  steer 
collective emotions and feelings, and this part of media 
logic quickly disseminated to all kinds of areas. Political 
elections are no longer thinkable without the fight to 
control  camera  angles;  the  same  spotlights  framing 
movie  stars  and  sports  heroes  also  frame  political 
messages.  Coverage of  citizen revolts (from Beijing's 
Tiananmen Square in 1989 to Cairo's Tahrir Square in 
2010) would not have had worldwide impact without 
protestors understanding the laws of mass media logic, 
resulting  in  arresting  images  of  bloody  protestors, 
spokespersons, and gripping action footage [15,17-19]. 
Commercials, entertainment, and news all blend into a 
seamless flow of images, defined by the televisual laws 
of ever-shorter sound bites, glitzy shots, and poignant 
close-ups.
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These changes in media organizations as well as in 
mass media's technological affordances have rendered 
the explanatory power of media logic as a legitimizing 
force even more intriguing. However, while much crit-
ical  work  has  focused  on  conceptualizing  media  as 
public  spaces or  spheres, media  logic has remained 
under-theorized in communication and media studies. 
The allure of such focus becomes particularly poignant 
when  new technological  and  economic  mechanisms 
emerge,  transforming  the  character  of  the  media 
landscape at large and media logic in particular. Be-
sides  the  general  transformations  of  the  1980s 
sketched above, there are a number of developments 
that have reshaped media logic, including the emer-
gence, in the 1990s, of computer mediated interaction 
through the Web, the ubiquity of mobile computing, 
and  the  growth  of  social  media  platforms.  Various 
technological  and  cultural  trends  in  computing con-
verged in the meteoric rise of social media platforms, 
which, in turn, greatly accelerated the transformation 
of the media landscape as well as of other social do-
mains. Along with these changes came a new set of 
technological,  economic,  and  socio-cultural  mechan-
isms, which we would like to refer to as social media 
logic.  Social  media  logic  needs  to  be  distinguished 
from  mass  media  logic  because  the  two  sets  of 
strategies and tactics emerged from a different tech-
nological  and  economic  lineage.  We  explore  below 
how social media logic blends with "established" mass 
media  logic,  while  also  adding  new  elements  and 
transforming already existing mechanisms.
3. Elements of Social Media Logic
Social media can be roughly referred to as a "group of 
Internet-based applications that build on the ideolo-
gical  and  technological  foundations  of  the  Web 2.0 
and that allow the creation and exchange of user-gen-
erated content" ([20], p. 60) The quick rise of social 
media platforms in the first decade of this century was 
part of a more general networked culture where in-
formation and communication got increasingly defined 
by  the  affordances  of  web  technologies  such  as 
browsers and search engines. Social networking sites 
like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn as well as user-
generated content sites, including YouTube and Flickr, 
became the core of a host of web-based applications 
that together formed an expansive ecosystem of con-
nective media [21]. Inferring from these conditions, 
we contend that social media logic refers to the pro-
cesses, principles, and practices through which these 
platforms process information, news, and communica-
tion,  and  more  generally,  how  they  channel  social 
traffic. Like mass media, social media have the ability 
to transport their logic outside of the platforms that 
generate  them,  while  their  distinctive  technological, 
discursive,  economic,  and  organizational  strategies 
tend to remain implicit or appear "natural". In order to 
explicate  social  media  logic  as  a  particular  set  of 
strategies and mechanisms, we select four main ele-
ments for further elaboration: programmability, pop-
ularity,  connectivity,  and  datafication.  The  point  of 
identifying these four elements is not to provide an 
exhaustive analytical model of social media logic, but 
to identify a few of its main contrivances and illustrate 
their systematic interdependence. In addition, we will 
argue how social media logic is entangled with mass 
media logic, and how this intricate choreography af-
fects  the relative shaping of  private,  corporate,  and 
state forces.
3.1. Programmability
When print and broadcasting still dominated the me-
diascape, the term "programming" related to sched-
uled  content.  Following  Raymond  Williams,  Altheide 
and Snow noticed how programming was an editorial 
strategy for channels and broadcasters to glue their 
audiences to the screen from one segment to the next 
[4,5]. In mass media logic, the term thus referred to 
technology  and cultural form: the ability of a central 
agency to manipulate content in order to define the 
audience's watching experience as a continuous flow. 
When gravitating towards the Web, the concepts "pro-
gramming" and "flow" acquired a different meaning, 
shifting their emphases from content and audiences 
to code and users, and from programmed flow to pro-
grammability.  In  social  media  logic,  one-way  traffic 
yielded  to  two-way  traffic  between  users  and  pro-
grammers—a process that affected both the technolo-
gical  and social  mediation of content [22].  On sites 
like  Twitter  or  Reddit,  users  can  post  content  and 
steer  information  streams,  while  the  sites'  owners 
may tweak their platforms' algorithms and interfaces 
to influence data traffic.  Programmability  can hence 
be defined as the ability of a social media platform to 
trigger  and  steer  users'  creative  or  communicative 
contributions,  while  users,  through  their  interaction 
with these coded environments, may in turn influence 
the flow of communication and information activated 
by such a platform.
The first part of this definition is grounded in tech-
nology, and pertains largely to computer code, data, 
algorithms, protocols, interfaces and the platform or-
ganizations  that  are  responsible  for  programming 
[23]. While algorithms are nothing but sets of coded 
instructions, it is important to observe how social me-
dia platforms shape all  kinds of  relational  activities, 
such as liking, favoriting, recommending, sharing and 
so  on.  For  instance,  Facebook's  interface  channels 
users into "friending" other users, implicitly redefining 
this social concept [24]. Some algorithms, like the one 
underlying  the  "people  you  may  know  button"  on 
LinkedIn, automatically suggest social relations on the 
basis of  inferred data.  The power of  algorithms, as 
David  Beer  contends,  lies  in  their  programmability: 
programmers  steer  user  experiences,  content,  and 
user relations via platforms [25].
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These technological mechanisms are often invisible. 
Coding  techniques  are  difficult  to  observe  except 
through  visible  user  interfaces  and  application  pro-
gramming  interfaces  (APIs),  and  sometimes  though 
their (open) source codes. Unlike the television sched-
ules of mass media logic, technological programmability 
in social media logic is hard to analyze in part because 
algorithms are proprietary and thus kept a secret, and 
partly because they are constantly adapted to evolving 
business models and user practices [24,26]. As Americ-
an media studies scholar Tarleton Gillespie explains, the 
programmability of social interaction has become paradig-
matic in a media environment dominated by platforms: 
we now rely on the algorithmic assessment of informa-
tion just as we used to rely on credentialed experts or 
scientific evidence in the discourse of mass media [27]. 
Editorial (human) choices, as Gillespie contends, have 
not vanished; on the contrary, programmability means 
that human editorial  selections are processed imper-
ceptibly and automatically [28].
The second part of the programmability definition, 
though, relates to  human agency: users retain signi-
ficant agency in the process of steering programmab-
ility not only through their own contributions but also 
because  they may resist  coded instructions  or  defy 
protocols.  In  response  to  actual  usage,  a  platform 
may need to adjust its policies in order to keep pleas-
ing its crowds and advertisers. Reddit, a social media 
site with some 62 million users, illustrates this two-
tiered rationality: the site lets its registered users—an-
onymous  or  identifiable—post  comments  or  links  to 
topics  deemed  noteworthy.  Reddit  generally  leaves 
more power to its users in terms of what to post and 
how to channel attention to a topic than Facebook or 
YouTube. Anyone who starts a "SubReddit"  becomes 
his or her own editor of the flow of information, decid-
ing who can add and who has access. As an "attention 
aggregator", Reddit relies on its algorithms as well as 
on the vigilance of its users to operate the platform; its 
operators refuse to take on the role or responsibilities 
of news reporters, thus defying an editorial function. 
However,  exporting  this  new social  media  logic—the 
mutual shaping of the information flow by owners and 
users—to discourses outside the platform proper, inev-
itably leads to a blend with mass media logic. In April 
2013,  a  police  hunt  for  the  suspects  of  the  Boston 
Marathon  bombers  fueled  a  SubReddit  "findboston-
bombers", which led to a stream of amateur sleuths 
and  false  accusations  towards  innocent  high  school 
students. When Reddit was vehemently criticized for its 
lack of editorial accountability, the platform issued an 
apology and promised to change its tactics—enhancing 
its codes and protocols as well as fortifying its users vi-
gilance and filter substreams for their tone of voice. 
The logic of programmability thus inevitably mixes 
the crowdsourcing principles of social media with the 
editorial values expected of mass media. In mass me-
dia  logic,  "programming"  referred  to  an  editorial 
strategy that manifested itself through the selection, 
juxtaposition,  and promotion of certain items in the 
flow  of  scheduled  content.  Now  that  the  flow  has 
taken an "algorithmic turn," content is not just pro-
grammed by a central agency, even if this agency still 
has  considerable  control;  users  also  participate  in 
steering content, distinguishing it from William's pro-
grammed flow [29]. The Reddit example shows how 
platform owners are not the only power brokers in the 
social media universe: users themselves also have the 
ability to shape these algorithmic mechanisms. They 
can either "go with the flow" or they can manipulate 
coded interaction, for instance by massively retweeting 
or liking particular content, thereby pushing a topic to 
become trending. In doing so, platform programmers 
and users continuously negotiate the terms of social in-
teraction. In the case of the Facebook riots in Haren, 
cited at the beginning of this article, users exploited the 
programmability of various platforms, not only by delib-
erately  ignoring the erroneous privacy setting of  the 
sixteen-year-old  girl,  but  also  by  exploiting the  plat-
form's functionality to send the message to as many 
"friends" as possible.
Due to the two-way nature of online traffic, pro-
grammability  has serious consequences not only for 
the design of "platformed" sociality but also for social 
activities mitigated by social institutions, such as the 
mass  media and  law and order.  Although program-
mability  might  be  considered  as  a  unique  game 
changer, as a central element of social media logic it is 
inescapably part of a larger configuration. It has not 
only become intricately intertwined with the logic of 
mass media,  but also with the strategies of  advert-
ising, public relations, activism, and other public dis-
courses. We will return to this larger configuration in a 
later section.
3.2. Popularity
A second principle of social media logic is popularity. 
Mass media logic already divulged a potent mechan-
ism for  pushing "likeable"  people  to  become media 
personalities;  depending on their  ability  to  play  the 
media and lure crowds, a variety of actors, from politi-
cians to entertainers, accumulated mass attention, of-
ten achieving the status of celebrity. Besides fame and 
popularity,  mass media's  power  in  terms of  agenda 
setting or pushing certain topics to the fore has been 
a much-theorized subject amongst academics [30]. As 
Altheide and Snow already contended in 1979, mass 
media's ability to shape public opinion by filtering out 
influential  voices  and  assigning  some  expressions 
more weight, attested to its power [4]. In the early 
years of their existence, social media platforms held 
the promise of being more egalitarian and democratic 
than  mass  media  in  a  sense  that  all  users  could 
equally participate and contribute content.  However, 
as platforms like Facebook and Twitter matured, their 
techniques for filtering out popular items and influen-
tial people became gradually more sophisticated. Al-
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though each platform's strategies for advancing some 
topics  and prioritizing particular  users differ, we will 
try to describe the general underpinning dynamics in-
volved in online popularization. How does the pursuit 
of online attention become part of a media logic that 
influences what people find important? And how does 
this logic mesh with (mass) media logic in online or 
offline public discourses, even if they arise from sep-
arate conditions?
In line with the feature of programmability, popular-
ity  is  conditioned  by  both  algorithmic and  socio-
economic components.  Each platform has its  distinct 
mechanisms for boosting popularity of people, things, 
or ideas, which is measured mostly in quantified terms. 
Inscribed in Facebook's EdgeRank and Twitter's Trend-
ing Topics are algorithms that push some topics and 
devalue others [24,28,31] Facebook's Like-scores auto-
matically  select  emotive  and  positive  evaluations  of 
topics,  rather  than  asking  for  complex  assessments. 
The Like-mechanism claims to promote a social experi-
ence  but  the  button  simultaneously  figures  in  an 
automated  "like-economy"  [32].  Along  similar  lines, 
Twitter's Trending Topics feature enables users to boost 
certain topics  or  news items, while Retweets offer a 
tool to widely "endorse" a specific tweet. But Twitter 
also  actively  pushes  Promoted  Tweets—paid  for  by 
companies and personalized via algorithms to fit specif-
ic Twitter-streams. In spite of the platform's egalitarian 
image,  some people  on  Twitter  are  more  influential 
than others, partly because the platform tends to be 
dominated by few users with large followings, partly 
because  the  platform assigns  more  weight  to  highly 
visible users. For instance, users such as CNN's Middle 
East  correspondent  Christiane  Amanpour  get  more 
weight  than  other  experts  or  witnesses.  Popularity 
boosting is thus two-way traffic: algorithms automatic-
ally assign differentiated value, but users themselves 
may  also  engage  in  concerted  efforts  to  lift  certain 
people's visibility.
Platforms themselves have an increasing interest in 
standardizing their metrics and making them mean-
ingful in social life outside their platform proper. The lo-
gic  of  online  popularity  resides  in  banners  for  "most 
viewed" videos on YouTube, friend stats on Facebook, or 
follower counts on Twitter. Furthermore, each platform is 
in the business of developing its own thermometer for 
measuring aggregated popularity or influence:  we now 
have Facebook Memology for a top-ten of most popular 
topics,  Google Analytics for measuring a site's traffic 
and  sales,  and  Twitter's  top-100 of  people  with  the 
largest followings.  Each corporation actively  seeks to 
promote  their  popularity  and ranking mechanisms in 
order to enhance the value of its platform and its users.
Besides individual platforms deploying these strategies, 
there are also a number of new platforms who meas-
ure popularity scores and reputational rankings across 
the  board:  Klout  scores  calculate  individual  user's 
presence and influence on all platforms by deploying 
complex—and  often  controversial—algorithms  [33]. 
Based on this number, advertisers or employers may 
single out certain "superusers" and pay them to per-
form promotional tasks or jobs ("People with a Klout 
score below 45 need not apply"). In the online ecology 
of  platforms,  popularity  and  influence  have  created 
their  own  standards,  complementing  the  popularity 
metrics already distributed by mass media.
On the one hand, social media logic  complements 
mass media logic  and enhances its  dominant  norms 
and tactics, just adding an extra dimension. Traditional 
mass media have wielded popularity filters for decades; 
one just needs to think of Time Magazine's list of "100 
most influential people" and its "Person of the Year". 
And, as Altheide and Snow already noticed, the "vox-
pop strategy" is an age-old tactic—singling out citizens 
as  spokespersons  for  a  certain  public  segment  [4]. 
Social  media's  claim that  online  metrics  complement 
popularity  tactics  already  wielded  by  mass  media  is 
therefore  an  evidential  part  of  its  logic.  Influential 
Twitter users are beginning to find their way into the 
star-system of mass media alongside media celebrities; 
TV-shows increasingly define the "news of the day" or 
decide whom to interview on the basis of Twitter trends 
or  by  looking  into  Facebook  discussions.  Journalists 
from news media often treat tweets from celebrities or 
politicians  as  quotes—a  peculiar  reinforcement  of 
Twitter's powerful  function as a public  relations tool. 
Platform metrics are increasingly accepted as legitimate 
standards to measure and rank people and ideas; these 
rankings are then amplified through mass media and in 
turn reinforced by users through social buttons such as 
following and liking.
What makes this element of social media logic dif-
ferent from mass media logic, though, is its ability to 
measure popularity at the same time and by the same 
means  as  it  tries  to  influence or  manipulate  these 
rankings. The entangled activities of  measuring and 
manipulating expose a platform's technological afford-
ances,  while  concurrently  reflecting  users'  ability  to 
push specific interest to the frontlines of public atten-
tion. Groups of users who decide something needs to 
become "trending" can orchestrate a publicity wave to 
promote  a  particular  item,  which,  as  the  Occupy 
movement protestors  found out,  can be challenging 
on popular platforms such as Twitter [34] In the ex-
ample of the Facebook riots in Haren, a group of op-
portunists  shrewdly  deployed  the  Like  and  ReTweet 
buttons to stage a party that was not a party, and 
they managed to mesh up their powerful social tools 
with the prevailing tactics of mass media to achieve 
their preset disruptive goals. Along similar lines, Face-
book and Twitter's platform owners have used their 
popularity rankings to promote commercial, public, or 
charity  causes  (e.g.  organ  donation  by  Facebook's 
Mark Zuckerberg) [35]. It is exactly the export of so-
cial  media popularity mechanisms to other social  or 
commercial environments that proves the efficacy of 
its  logic  in  challenging existing social  hierarchies  or 
unsettling discursive orders.
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Mass media logic and social media logic get incre-
mentally entangled in defining the popularity of issues 
and  the  influence  of  people.  Popularity  becomes en-
meshed in a feedback loop between mass and social 
media, and, as was argued in the case of programmabil-
ity,  becomes  part  of  a  larger  cultural  arena  where 
different institutional discourses and counter-discourses 
engage in a struggle to make their logics more pressing. 
Two more elements play a central role in the syntax of 
social media logic: connectivity and datafication.
3.3. Connectivity
In Altheide and Snow's theory on mass media logic, 
"the media" was generally presented as an amorphous 
palette of media organizations whose aim—dependent 
on their public or commercial objectives—is to connect 
content to citizens or to link advertisers to consumers 
[4].  Traditional  media  institutions  have  always  ad-
dressed  particular  national  or  regional  audiences  in 
crafting  news,  information,  and  entertainment  while 
selling audience attention to geographically or demo-
graphically  assorted  customers. When  social  media 
platforms emerged in the early 2000s, their primary 
pursuit seemed to be  connectedness: Facebook, es-
tablished in 2004, wanted college students to be able 
to connect and share,  whereas user-generated con-
tent  platforms  such  as  YouTube,  started  in  2005, 
aimed  at  connecting  users  to  (self-made)  content. 
Many social media platforms—the most prominent of 
these being Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter—still pro-
mote their networked services as enablers of human 
connections. However, even if human connectedness 
or "participation" is still a valid part of social media's 
logic, a more encompassing and accurate term to cap-
ture this element of logic is connectivity. Connectivity, 
which originated as  a  hardware  term,  refers  to  the 
socio-technical  affordance of networked platforms to 
connect  content  to  user  activities  and  advertisers. 
More  precisely,  in  a  connective  ecosystem of  social 
media,  the  "platform  apparatus"  always  mediates 
users' activities and defines how connections are tak-
ing shape, even if users themselves can exert consid-
erable influence over the contribution of content.
Connectivity partly overlaps but also distinctly dif-
fers  from the  notion  of  "spreadibility"  introduced  by 
Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford and Joshua Green [36]. While 
spreadibility  recognizes "the importance of  the social 
connections  among  individuals"  they  contend  that 
these connections are merely "amplified" by social me-
dia platforms ([36], p. 6). The notion of spreadibility 
accentuates  the  power  of  audience  agency,  while 
deemphasizing  the  power  of  platform  agency  as  a 
steering force. Connectivity, instead, equally emphas-
izes the  mutual  shaping of  users,  platforms,  advert-
isers, and, more generally, online performative environ-
ments.  Unlike  mass  media,  social  media  platforms 
seldom  deal  with  "natural"  geographically  or  demo-
graphically delineated audiences; instead, they exped-
ite connections between individuals, partly allowing the 
formation of strategic alliances or communities through 
users' initiative, partly forging target audiences through 
tactics of automated group formation ("groups you may 
be interested in" on Flickr) or personalized recommenda-
tions ("People who bought this item also bought…" on 
Amazon).  Connectivity  introduces  a  bipolar  element 
into the logic of social media: a strategic tactic that ef-
fectively enables human connectedness while pushing 
automated  connectivity.  A  number  of  theorists  have 
chosen one side of this double logic, either to hail so-
cial media's liberating and communitarian potential, or 
to lament some platforms' predispositions as vehicles 
for customized advertising [37]. Our point in introdu-
cing the element of connectivity is to argue how social 
media logic does both at the same time. Let us look 
more closely to each end of this fallacious opposition.
The human connectedness efficacy of social media 
derives from early network sociology. Well before the 
rise of social platforms, sociologist Barry Wellman and 
colleagues  argued  that  new media  technologies  in-
volve a substantial shift in sociality from densely knit 
groups  to  loosely  bounded social  networks  of  rela-
tions, which he labels "networked individualism". Net-
worked individualism presupposes that people directly 
connect to other people with whom they are involved 
in specialized relationships of common interest. This 
type  of  sociality  revolves  around  the  person  rather 
than the group or locality [38,39]. New media,  and 
especially also social platforms, ostensibly offer users 
the opportunity to pick and choose others to connect 
with and communicate on a personal basis. From this 
perspective,  these media allow individuals  to create 
their own customized social networks and communit-
ies (for a critical analysis of these trends see [40,41]).
Particularly interesting in this regard is the work by 
Bennett and Segerberg, who observe in their research 
on contemporary protests a shift from "collective" ac-
tion to "connective" action [42]. They maintain that 
protest  movements  have  traditionally  depended  on 
the construction and spreading of collective identifica-
tion and action frames, which require formal hierarch-
ical organizations and membership groups, to educate 
people and tie them to these frames [43-45]. Accord-
ing  to  Bennett  and  Segerberg,  in  contemporary 
protests  this  type  of  collective  action is  mixed with 
connective action—a hybrid that increasingly applies 
"to life in late modern societies in which formal organ-
izations are losing their grip on individuals, and group 
ties are being replaced by large-scale, fluid social net-
works"  ([42],  p.  748).  The  authors  emphasize  that 
these networks do not require strong organizational 
control or a collective identity; instead, social techno-
logies function as organizing agents. For instance, in 
the  2011  Occupy  movements,  technology-enabled 
personal networks did not simply function as commu-
nication systems but also empowered flexible organiz-
ations that allowed rapid action and coordinated ad-
justments. In our example of the Haren riots, people 
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who had never met before rapidly refashioned Face-
book and Twitter into organizational instruments.
In the double logic of connectivity, the flipside of 
networked individualism seems to be networked cus-
tomization or  automated personalization. When mass 
media still reigned, the alliance between consumers, 
content (or products) and advertisers always entailed 
a strategic deployment of recommendations and social 
networks to sell goods or services. Whether it be doc-
tors in white coats, department store "loyalty-cards", 
neighbors organizing Tupperware parties, or endorse-
ments  from  friends  or  celebrities—recommendation 
culture predates the advent of social networks. What 
is  new  in  the  context  of  social  media  networks, 
though, are the mechanisms of deep personalization 
and  networked  customization.  These  terms  refer  to 
online content calibration based on assumptions about 
individual  user's  needs and platform owners'  or  ad-
vertisers' interests. Connectivity should thus be seen 
as an advanced strategy of algorithmically connecting 
users to content, users to users, platforms to users, 
users to advertisers, and platforms to platforms. But 
the boundaries between human connections and com-
mercially and technologically steered activities are in-
creasingly obfuscated. For instance, automated links 
between users and products via Facebook Likes help 
advertisers utilize recommendation tactics for promot-
ing products to "friends"—even if users are unaware 
of their being used for these purposes.
The  recommendation  culture  grounded  in  auto-
mated connectivity shows the same Janus-face quality 
as we noticed with regards to networked individual-
ism:  some  users  appreciate  the  service  offered  by 
platforms to connect them to likeminded people, pre-
ferred items, or individualized taste; others loathe net-
worked customization as a signal of intruded privacy 
or  commercial  exploitation  of  user  information.  Our 
point is not to side with any one side of this conten-
tious equation,  but to  analyze how the connectivity 
element, as part of social media logic, is deployed to 
reshape hierarchies between private, public, and cor-
porate interests. Connectivity in the context of both 
networked individualism and networked customization 
are significant new armaments in the struggle to re-
define the boundaries between private and public and 
between commerce and state. Even though YouTube, 
Facebook  and  Twitter  employ  different  mechanisms 
for  enabling  and  forging  connections,  their  various 
strategies fit a coherent logic. However, if we want to 
understand the mechanisms underpinning their inter-
operability, we need to turn to the fourth element in 
which social media logic is rooted: datafication.
3.4. Datafication
Part of mass media logic, especially television, was al-
ways the ability to reach mass audiences in real time 
coupled onto their ability to do audience research. Tele-
vision's magic was (and still is) its ability to draw large 
crowds to watch live images—liveness still carrying the 
connotation of unmediated events evolving in real time, 
simply "captured" by the camera's eye and often signi-
fying emotion and intensity [6,8]. Knowing more about 
viewer's profiles and tastes not only helped fine-tune 
programming decisions but also provide advertisers with 
precise figures to make paid messages more effective. 
Altheide and Snow already remarked how the use of rat-
ings, polls, and other surveys served as predictors of 
audiences' predilections [4]. One might argue that mass 
media's ability to enhance audience predictability and to 
provide real-time audience experiences is an essential 
ingredient of its powerful logic. If we subsequently look 
at  social  media logic,  we may discern how platforms 
have developed their own strategies for predicting and 
repurposing user needs, while also nursing their  own 
equivalent of "real-timeness". Both notions, we contend, 
are grounded in the principle of datafication.
Datafication,  according  to  Viktor  Mayer-Schoen-
berger and Kenneth Cukier, refers to the ability of net-
worked platforms to render into data many aspects of 
the world that have never been quantified before: not 
just demographic or profiling data yielded by custom-
ers  in  (online)  surveys,  but  automatically  derived 
metadata  from smart  phones  such  as  time  stamps 
and  GPS-inferred  locations  [46].  When  it  comes  to 
computer-mediated communication, each type of con-
tent—be  it  music,  books,  or  videos—is  treated  as 
data; more specifically with regards to social network-
ing  platforms,  even  relationships  (friends,  likes, 
trends) are datafied via Facebook or Twitter. All three 
elements heretofore explored—programmability, pop-
ularity, connectivity—are grounded in the condition of 
datafication. In early theories of social media, (meta)
data were often considered a byproduct of online net-
works, but as platforms gradually matured, they have 
turned more into data firms, deriving their business 
models  from their  ability  to  harvest  and  repurpose 
data rather than from monetizing user activity proper 
[40].  Datafication  endowed  social  media  platforms 
with the potential to develop techniques for predictive 
and real-time analytics.
Social media platforms, like mass media, handle a 
variety of online systems for rating, polling, and survey-
ing user responses; but beyond expressly triggered re-
sponses,  platforms  ostensibly  have  the  capacity  for 
polling  built  into their  architecture.  Facebook  and 
Twitter increasingly wield their potential to mine on-
line  social  traffic  for  indicators  of  trending  topics, 
keywords, sentiments, public viewpoints, or frequently 
shared  and  liked  items.  Microblogging  tool  Twitter, 
more than any other platform, promotes itself as an 
echo chamber of people's opinions, even positioning 
itself  as a replacement of  offline opinion polls  [47]. 
The idea that social  media are neutral,  unmediated 
spaces is an important assumption ingrained in many 
definitions of data flows. Part of social media's logic 
lies  in  the  assertion  that  data  are  "raw"  resources 
merely being "channeled" through online veins, allow-
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ing researchers to perform "opinion mining" or "senti-
ment analysis" [48-50]. Twitter supposedly measures 
informal sentiments, feelings, or underbellies of "the 
people" at a stage when they are still in the process 
of becoming "official" public opinion.
Lisa Gitelman aptly coined the adage "'raw data' is 
an oxymoron", meaning that data are always already 
prefigured through a platform's gathering mechanisms 
[51]. Moreover, in processing data, a platform does not 
merely "measure" certain expressions or opinions, but 
also helps mold them. In opening up "spontaneous" 
sentiments and opinions to the public eye, platforms 
have rendered them formalized and preformatted ex-
pressions—even though many tweets  appear,  to  say 
the least, unpolished. Hence, they can be assessed and 
influenced by  third  parties.  Opinions  and  sentiments 
expressed via Twitter are extremely vulnerable to ma-
nipulation—following a similar dynamic as social theor-
ists  previously  identified as pertaining to the role  of 
opinion polls in mass media logic [52]. The idea that 
you  can  tap  into  people's  unconsciousness  or  "idea 
formation" without affecting the processes of opinion 
making is a basic misconception, which goes back to 
the classic  observer effect—a concept familiar  to  re-
search method literature across disciplines [53].
What makes datafication a crucial characteristic for 
social media logic is its ability to add a real-time data 
dimension  to mass media's notion of liveness. Face-
book, LinkedIn, and particularly Twitter process large 
quantities  of  users'  behavioral  data  every  second. 
Much of social  media data's value lies in their real-
time "live" appearance: platforms claim they can track 
instantaneous movements of individual user behavior, 
aggregate  these  data,  analyze  them,  and  sub-
sequently translate the results into valuable informa-
tion about individuals, groups, or society at large. So-
cial  media  logic  of  detecting  representative  trends 
based on real-time analytics is  increasingly mingling 
with polling strategies established by mass media lo-
gic. For instance in the case of television audiences, 
Twitter  claims  to  have  equaled  the  Nielsen  ratings 
technique  to  measure  evaluative  viewer  responses 
[54].  Social media data streams are increasingly used 
as real-time analytics to complement or replace tradi-
tional polls issued by news media or professional agen-
cies. While the real-timeness of social media signific-
antly differs from the liveness of television, the blend of 
these two has considerable implications for both types 
of media as well as for public discourse at large. Think, 
for  instance,  of  online  analysts  tracking Twitter  data 
during live broadcasts of political debates, while partis-
an lobbyists are simultaneously trying to influence the 
course of the debate via Twitter [55,56].
While datafication underpins the online platforms' 
strategies of predictive and real-time analytics, it does 
not  intrinsically  ascribe  either commercial  or public 
meaning to  social  media logic;  instead,  the  deploy-
ment of these tactics in specific (institutional) contexts 
affords  users  and  platform  operators  to  attribute 
meaning. The principle of datafication can be used to 
predict user taste and insert personalized ads—as dis-
cussed in the previous section. However, data streams 
can also be aggregated to identify  public  health is-
sues, such as flu-epidemics being traced through Twit-
ter data. Consequently, this information can be used 
to send targeted ads for flu medication to all Twitter 
users in a particular afflicted area or to those twitter-
ers using specific key words. The very same data can 
serve  as  input  for  epidemiologists  to  help  develop 
early warning systems. 
Many  (state  and  corporate)  sectors  are  currently 
experiencing the power of datafication strategies de-
veloped by social media, and try to incorporate them 
into their  arsenal  of  available  instruments.  Police or 
law enforcement, for instance, can use real-time data 
for surveillance purposes. In the case of the Haren ri-
ots,  police  inspectors  used  the  many  videos  of  re-
belling  youngsters—put  up  on  YouTube  by  youth 
themselves on the evening of the riots to attract more 
people to  the scene—for  the  purpose of  identifying 
and bringing to court a number of law offenders. Plat-
forms like Twitter generate piles of data that may be 
extremely relevant to researchers interested in under-
standing social movements, group behavior, or large-
scale  health  trends.  Authorities  or  corporations,  for 
their part, may assign very different value or meaning 
to interpretations pursed out of these data piles.
One thing we should always take into account is 
the fact that generators of online data, particularly so-
cial media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, 
and  LinkedIn,  are  never  neutral  channels  for  data 
transmission.  An important  aspect  of  datafication  is 
the  invisibility or naturalness of its mechanics: meth-
ods for aggregation and personalization are often pro-
prietary  and  thus  often  inaccessible  to  public  or 
private scrutiny. Questions of ownership and privacy 
concerns are commonly leveled at data themselves: 
who can access private data and who is allowed to 
sell aggregate data? Can platforms be forced to sur-
render users' private data to the authorities? The ef-
fectiveness  of  legislation  that  regulates  agency and 
ownership in democracies that function mostly through 
national legislative contexts is increasingly problematic 
in  a  world where social  media companies and data 
firms operate globally.
As important as these questions are,  datafication 
logic also triggers more profound questions concern-
ing the changing norms of a data-driven, global social 
economy.  Reflecting  on  the  underlying  principle  of 
datafication, it  again becomes clear how the rise of 
social media affects user agency in complex ways. As 
Wendy Chun has noticed, interactive real-time inter-
faces empower users and "buttress notions of person-
al  action,  freedom,  and  responsibility,"  while  at  the 
same time they empower platforms to steer and exploit 
users' activities ([57], p. 74). The invisibility of datafica-
tion processes prompts questions about the actual rela-
tionship between data and users: are (real-time) data 
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flows indeed a reflection of real live activities, or are 
they the result of manipulative monitoring and steer-
ing? In the words of Louise Amoore ([58], p. 24), real-
time data flows may say less about us, but more about 
"what can be inferred about who we might be".
Combined  with  the  elements  of  programmability, 
popularity, and connectivity, the principle of datafication 
has  profound  implications  for  the  shaping  of  social 
traffic. Predictive analytics and real-time analytics are 
new tools in the struggle to prioritize certain (corpor-
ate, public, or private) values over others. We should 
try to understand these complex dynamics not just as 
they unfold within the boundaries of social media plat-
forms proper, but in their confrontations with different 
logics  dominating  other  institutional  contexts.  There-
fore, it is crucial to further develop a theoretical model 
that helps understand how all elements work interde-
pendently in creating a coherent fabric, and also helps 
explain how this social media logic mixes with (offline) 
institutional  logics.  The  double-edged  sword  of  em-
powerment—of users and platforms—is a recurring trope 
in the evolving socio-technical logic of social media.
4. Social Media Logic and the Redefinition of 
Public Value
The  four  elements  of  social  media  logic—program-
mability, popularity, connectivity and datafication—are 
pivotal in understanding how in a networked society 
social interaction is mediated by an intricate dynamic 
of mass media, social media platforms, and offline in-
stitutional processes. Over the past years, social me-
dia  logic  has  gradually  infiltrated mass media logic, 
sometimes  enhancing  it,  sometimes  undercutting or 
replacing parts of it. By shifting our focus away from 
institutions to (social) media logic as a transforming 
force, we wanted to identify key principles propelling 
social interaction in a networked data-driven ecology. 
Concentrating on the  mechanisms and strategies at 
work in social media logic, we tried to theorize a new 
constellation  of  power  relationships  in  which  social 
practices  are  profoundly  reshaped  [17].  We  raised 
questions such as: How does social media logic modi-
fy or enhance existing mass media logic? And how is 
this new media logic exported beyond the boundaries 
of (social or mass) media proper? 
The principles, mechanisms, and strategies under-
lying social  media logic  may be  relatively  simple  to 
identify,  but it  is  much harder to  map the complex 
connections  between  platforms  that  distribute  this 
logic:  users  that  use  them,  technologies  that  drive 
them, economic structures that scaffold them, and in-
stitutional bodies that incorporate them. If we return to 
the example of the "Facebook riots" in Haren, cited at 
the beginning of this article, we refused to pinpoint one 
particular actor as the main culprit of an unpredicted 
series of events. What we did instead was to "reas-
semble the social", to use Bruno Latour's terminology, 
by deconstructing the logic by which these events oc-
curred; not to locate a responsible actor or cause, but 
to  learn  more  about  the  mechanisms  and  principles 
involved in the shaping of such events. [59]. Put simply: 
what  happens  when  social  media  logic  meets  other 
institutional logics outside the context of social media 
platforms  proper?  In  contemporary  society,  no  in-
stitution can afford to look away from this logic be-
cause  they have all  become implicated in  the  same 
media culture: every major institution is part and parcel 
of this transformation in which the social gets infiltrated 
by a revamped media logic.
Over the past few years, social media have some-
times erroneously been regarded as ready-to-use tools 
for citizens, rioters, journalists,  and activists to bring 
about social change, whether civil disruption, such as in 
Haren, or social uprisings, such as the ones in Tunisia 
and Egypt in 2011, which were casually tagged as "the 
Twitter revolutions". Epithets such as these divulge de-
ceptive assumptions about the role of social media and 
their relation to mass media, users, and social institu-
tions [60,61]. In the field of social activism, Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter are attributed momentous influ-
ence in the processes of mobilizing a following. As we 
have argued in this article, social media platforms can 
neither take credit nor blame for single-handedly trans-
forming social processes or for turning around events. 
Like the mass media in the 1960s and 1970s, which 
were regarded as major influential forces in reshaping 
social order, social media, in the first decades of the 
new millennium, are likely to be seen as new unruly 
forces in a global transformation.
We neither intend to applaud the successes of these 
media nor rally against their insidious affects; the aim 
is to systematically analyze social media mechanisms 
as sources of transformation. Examining media logic, 
mass media and social platforms can hardly be seen as 
separate forces when it comes to controlling informa-
tion  and  communication  processes.  As  conventional 
mass media are just starting to grapple with this new 
logic,  other  institutions,  too,  realize  they  can  hardly 
escape the imperative of social  media logic. Not just 
police,  law  enforcers,  and  activists,  but  all  kinds  of 
actors—in education, politics, arts, entertainment, and 
so forth—are confronted with the basic contrivances of 
programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafica-
tion. The elements of social media logic identified in this 
chapter should help to understand the nature of com-
munication and information processes in the networked 
conditions of social life. By offering a systematic explora-
tion  of  the  logic  sustaining this  messy  dynamic,  we 
hope to inspire other researchers to look at specific case 
studies through this  analytical  prism and to critically 
interrogate the connections we have drawn.
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